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Belonging and Indifference to Europe: A Study  
of Young People in Brussels 
Florence Delmotte, Heidi Mercenier & Virginie Van Ingelgom∗ 
Abstract: »Zugehörigkeitsgefühl und Gleichgültigkeit Europa gegenüber: Eine 
Erhebung unter jungen Brüsselern«. This paper proposes to contribute to test-
ing the hypothesis of a “drag effect of the habitus” and investigating empiri-
cally the significations of the “I/we/they” categories. It is based on “focus 
groups” organised with 35 young people in Brussels who were interviewed 
about their relations to the politics at different levels. It aims more generally at 
gaining a better understanding of how the feelings of belonging work, by fo-
cusing on the supposed lack of them and indifference regarding Europe today. 
The article firstly sums up what the “habitus drag effect” consists of, according 
to a certain reading of Elias’s work. This section also aims at stressing how this 
idea from Elias although formulated in the 1980s is still stimulating to consider 
the EU and legitimacy issues 30 years later. The next section briefly reviews the 
recent evolutions in EU studies, the major advances and the remaining blind 
spots. The last and most important part is an attempt to illustrate how empiri-
cal material contributes to investigating these blind spots. At the end, the dis-
cussions with the young “Brusselers” partially validate, on the one hand, par-
tially refute, on the other hand, and in any case enrich some of the 
propositions formulated by Elias’s historical sociology, particularly around the 
“we/they” relationships. 
Keywords: Norbert Elias, European integration, indifference, (feelings of) be-
longing, young people, Brussels. 
1.   Introduction  
In his late text “Changes in the ‘We-I’ Balance” published in The Society of 
Individuals (2010 [1987]), Norbert Elias advocated that the resistance of old 
national habitus was the main impediment to the development of a supra- or 
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postnational political and social integration (Elias 2010, 188). More specifical-
ly the national habitus drag effect would entail a lack of feeling of belonging at 
the European level (Elias 2010 [1987], 189; 201-2), a situation that Elias seems 
to deplore. Nevertheless, the sociologist as a “myth-hunter” is far from consid-
ering the increase of European feelings simply as a “good thing” in itself, or as 
a desirable development as such. Feelings of belonging are, on the other hand, 
hardly considered as something that people or institutions could choose, create 
or even deliberately foster. Rather, the author of On the Process of Civilisation 
(Elias 2012 [1939]) reminds us that, for centuries, modern states have not been 
nation states: in many cases, states have been for a long time deprived of a 
national “we” significance, for a majority of people did not identify closely 
with it. For this achievement, states required two developments that only oc-
curred in the 20th century: democratization of citizenship (parliamentary repre-
sentation of formerly excluded social groups such as workers), and mass wars 
(that fostered feelings of solidarity between nationals) (Elias 2010 [1987], 186; 
Delmotte 2012). 
Yet, the European Union obviously and cruelly lacks actual democracy 
(Follesdal and Hix 2006; Miller 1995, 2000), as well as an external enemy that 
could have fed, like in the case of national integration, a European we-feeling 
(Debray 1994; Schnapper 1994, 45). In this perspective, it seems easy to con-
clude that such a double deficiency, more than the supposed complexity of the 
system, at least partly explains persisting indifference in the perspective of a 
number of European citizens towards the European Union’s institutions and 
politics. The point is not only to explain how and why people feel and seem 
involved “for” or “against” the EU, and what the result is for the EU. This 
question has indeed been broadly investigated from the 1990s by “mainstream” 
EU studies and by sociological analysis of the political parties. More recently, 
the questioning of how and why many people feel indeed hardly concerned, not 
really “sceptical” or consciously doubtful, but standing back, so to speak lag-
ging behind, has appeared more and more crucial; notably in order to better 
understand a kind of passive and still often underestimated resistance to the EU 
(Delmotte 2008; Duchesne et al. 2013; Van Ingelgom 2014). 
This encompassing hypothesis is one of those we came to test in the frame 
of a collective research dedicated to social and political legitimacy issues at the 
European level, with a special attention paid to (de-)regulation and free move-
ment.1 In 2013-2014, a series of focus groups (collective interviews) were 
organised with young people (16-26 years old) in six contrasted areas/ 
neighbourhoods of Brussels (Mercenier 2016). These collective interviews 
aimed at better understanding how young people, citizens or future citizens, 
                                                             
1  This study was supported by Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles in the frame of a Concerted 
Research Action (or “ARC”, a Belgian research programme) entitled “Why regulate? Regula-
tion, deregulation and the legitimacy of the EU: A legal and political analysis.”  
HSR 42 (2017) 4  │  229 
consider the EU, Europe, European politics, and politics in general. Such an 
enquiry more generally contributes to fill in a gap. Big surveys like Euroba-
rometer often reduce opinions to a support/reject opposition based on closed 
preformatted questions (Van Ingelgom 2014) while traditional political sociol-
ogy focuses on political parties’ programmes and on electoral issues. A qualita-
tive comprehensive and micro-sociological approach is by contrast more fo-
cused on how some people express their thoughts and feelings often in a more 
nuanced or contrasted way by talking with each other. 
In a nutshell, this article aims at better understanding how the feelings of be-
longing work and to what extent they really matter, by focusing on the sup-
posed lack of them and on indifference regarding Europe today. This objective 
is based on three approaches respectively held by the authors and complement-
ing each other. The first is an attempt at questioning the political topicality of a 
classic exercise to think about contemporary Europe by transposing its proposi-
tions into the current context. The second approach takes part in the “sociologi-
cal turn” of EU studies by going beyond partitions in terms of “pro” versus 
“anti.” The latter is the enquiry that took place in Brussels to collect the ways 
35 young people perceive or represent politics in general and the EU in particu-
lar. Therefore, the text initially summarises the “habitus drag effect” outlined 
by Elias. The second part briefly reviews the recent evolutions in EU studies, 
the major advances and the remaining blind spots. The last section illustrates 
how the empirical material contributes to investigating these blind spots. It 
more particularly stresses: (1) the different significations of the we-they divi-
sions; (2) the place of the living experiences and the related emotions that 
emerge by dealing with political and European themes; (3) the scope and sig-
nificance of the supposed indifference to Europe and/or Euroscepticism of 
young people. At the end of the paper, the talks with the young “Brusselers” 
met in the focus groups partially validate, partially refute and in any case enrich 
some of Elias’s historical sociological propositions; particularly around the 
“we/they” relationships and the relative importance of an affective belonging, 
while affects and belonging are increasingly considered as very important both 
in the literature (Belot and Bouillaud 2008) and by (European) institutions.2 
2.  The Elias’s Drag Effect Hypothesis 
Before feelings and affects recently became fashionable in political analysis 
more broadly (Faure and Négrier 2017), the hypothesis based on the resistance 
                                                             
2  The role of attachments, positive feelings and belonging is for instance evident in the 
discourse justifying the “European year of citizens” (2013) and through the “Citizens’ Dia-
logues” set up by the European Commission in 2013 and 2014 (see Damay 2016, and Damay 
and Mercenier 2016). 
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of national identities had emerged in political theory and in EU studies in order 
to explain a specific kind of Euroscepticism or resistance (Coman and Lacroix 
2007; Costa et al. 2008; Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010). Yet we have already 
stressed that more than twenty years before, in the 1980s, Norbert Elias had 
pointed out that national habitus were major obstacles to the development of a 
“real” political and social integration process at the European level, and with 
the emphasis on the affective dimension of such habitus, explained why they 
were so important and resistant. He further developed that point in one of the 
last texts he wrote, in 1987 (Elias 2010). According to him, the national habitus 
drag effect both entails and explains a lack of feeling of belonging to a broader 
entity – such as “continental,” or European, for instance. In order to grasp it 
properly, and to eventually understand what is new in this phenomenon, we 
would have to follow Elias in taking a step back into the past and to consider at 
least how feelings of belonging had been developing at the national-state level. 
Elias more or less explicitly defines the “habitus drag effect” in the same 
text, Changes in the “We-I” Balance (2010, 188ff). This one is more of an 
essay, it does not refer to a specific sociological enquiry, but it mobilizes and 
consequently follows the main teachings of Elias’s historical sociology of the 
political. Sociologically speaking, in this piece Elias investigates further the 
problems of habitus in a long-term perspective. In a way, it is also one of Eli-
as’s most politically engaged texts, where he critically argues – that is to say 
without illusion and in a disenchanted way – in favour of a post-national inte-
gration. Although European building is not the only or not even the main topic 
of this essay, he makes a special focus on European integration, which appears 
at the same time as a real political preoccupation to him and (unfortunately) as 
a good example to illustrate, or even to demonstrate, according to him, certain 
aspects of his conception of habitus. Elias notably writes:  
[I]f we are looking for examples of the reality-congruence of the concept of 
habitus, we could hardly find a more cogent example than the persistent way 
in which the national habitus of the European nation states impedes their clos-
er political union. (Elias 2010 [1987], 188)  
In the following, Elias defines the “drag effect” as a “specific kind of habitus 
problem,” “somewhat underestimated on both the theoretical-empirical and the 
practical level” (Elias 2010 [1987], 188) and that depicts a  
constellation in which the dynamic of unplanned social processes tends to ad-
vance beyond a given stage towards another, which may be higher or lower, 
while the people affected by this change cling to the earlier stage in their per-
sonality structure, their social habitus. (Elias 2010 [1987], 189) 
Elias investigates perhaps most comprehensively the national habitus in anoth-
er text, The Germans (1996), in a socio-historical but also comparative way. 
Thanks to the preface, we know that by using the term “habitus” (by which 
Elias “basically means ‘second nature’ or ‘embodied social learning’” accord-
ing to Dunning and Mennell, 1996, ix), he precisely wanted to avoid using the 
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old and fixed notion of “national character.” Even when it appears relatively 
stable, habitus is always evolutionary and relational, but at the same time indi-
vidual and collective; everybody has a unique habitus depending on their cir-
cumstances and the multiple roles he or she plays. The ones that interest us are 
a kind of them that although distinct cannot be cut from the others (at work, in 
the family life, etc.). Political and national habitus are particularly important 
because they concern up to millions of individuals and can seem eternal, as 
“something inherent in nature, like birth and death” (Elias 2010 [1987], 203). 
They truly reveal a huge inertial force indeed. 
In the specific long-term and comparative perspective he promotes, Elias 
otherwise specifies that “[t]here are many examples of drag effects” and that 
the one just mentioned regarding Europe is  
easier to understand by looking from a greater distance to analogous events at 
an earlier stage of development, that of the transition from tribes to states as 
the dominant units of survival and integration. (Elias 2010 [1987], 189) 
By taking this distance, we can better understand and admit that the develop-
ment of feelings of belonging is, par excellence, a “blind and unplanned” his-
torical social process. It’s not that political leaders, institutions, and policies 
have absolutely no impact on it; it is more that they cannot “decide” or engen-
der such feelings or habitus, nor can they shape them as they “want.” Even only 
“stimulating” or reinforcing them through specific devices or communication 
policies – such as one the European Commission has recently experienced 
(Damay 2016; Damay and Mercenier 2016) – partially seem nonsense. People 
simply cannot “choose” their identities or, more exactly, to what and how they 
individually and collectively identify themselves:  
[I]n relation to their own group identity and, more widely, their own social 
habitus, people have no free choice. These things cannot be simply changed 
like clothes. (Elias 2010 [1987], 200)  
Identities, habitus, and “we-feelings” rather refer to relatively slow adaptation 
processes that occur (or not, or that occur late in best cases) in a manner to “fit” 
the reality of interdependencies that evolve comparatively faster. More precise-
ly, in the case of “political” habitus, these individuals tend to adapt to the polit-
ical communities or entities – survival units, Elias says (2010, 2012) – that first 
derive from growing interdependence and a changing balance of power be-
tween groups (Elias 2012 [1939]; Delmotte 2012). On that, Elias writes for 
example:  
The integration unit on the continental level may be understood to be a practi-
cal necessity, but unlike older national units it is not associated with strong 
we-feelings. And yet it is not unrealistic to suppose that in the future terms 
like ‘European’ or ‘Latin American’ will take on a far stronger emotive con-
tent than they have at present. (Elias 2010 [1987], 201-2) 
We just do not know yet. 
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Why this relative uncertainty? The nation-state case may help in understand-
ing the problem. For centuries indeed modern states have not been “nation 
states” with such strong we-feelings. As we already stressed, at first, states 
were “only states” – that is to say objective survival and domination units; not 
yet “nation states.” For long, states have indeed been deprived of a national 
“we” significance broadly shared by its members. They were not yet called 
“citizens” nor were they considered as composing “the nation,” which indeed is 
a very modern, contemporary conception, and a rather recent social and politi-
cal reality. According to Elias, the transformation of states into the nation-state, 
that is to say into socially integrative units, only occurred in the 20th century, 
noticeably with mass wars that required full mobilisation of the people. But 
what is more original compared with the dominant literature, and quite unusual 
in Elias’s work indeed, is the emphasis he puts on the democratization of citi-
zenship to explain this national integration process in most developed industrial 
countries (Delmotte 2012). To this respect, Elias came to reverse the usual way 
of examining the problem in Europe today, which often considers that feelings 
of belonging and identification processes come first. On the contrary Elias 
writes in the 1987 text: 
The more complete integration of all citizens into states has really only hap-
pened in the course of the twentieth century. Only in conjunction with the par-
liamentary representation of all classes did all members of the state begin to 
perceive it more as a we-unit and less as a they-group. Only in the course of 
the two great wars of this century did the populations of more developed in-
dustrial states take on the character of nations in the more modern sense of the 
word and their states the character of nation states. Nation states, one might 
say, are born in wars and for wars. Here we find the explanation for why, 
among the various layers of we-identity, the state level of integration today 
carries special weight and a special emotional charge. The integration plane of 
the state, more than any other layer of we-identity, has in the consciousness of 
most members the function of a survival unit, a protection unit on which de-
pends their physical and social security in the conflicts of human groups and 
in case of physical catastrophe. (Elias 2010 [1987], 186) 
The last part of the quotation is as much important as the first. This function of 
survival unit that the state has “only in the consciousness of most of its mem-
bers” (Elias 2010 [1987], 186), regardless of “how things stand in reality,” 
definitely matters. States may “threaten each other” (Elias 2010 [1987], 186), 
nation states may be revealed to be powerless in facing Tchernobyl kind of 
disasters (Elias 2010 [1987], 195). Yet the states still represent “survival units” 
(a “protection unit” on which would depend “physical and social security”). 
This is at the same time highly irrational, although Elias would hardly use this 
term (Elias 2010 [1987], 200-1), and of prime political and sociological im-
portance when “the emotive need for human society, a giving and receiving in 
affective relationships to other people, is one of the fundamental conditions of 
human existence” (Elias 2010 [1987], 180). That is why he seems to deplore 
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that “for most people, humankind as a frame of reference for we-identity is a 
blank space on the map of their emotions” (Elias 2010 [1987], 181). Elias 
writes further:  
The sense of responsibility for imperilled is minimal. Eminently realistic as 
such a concern may be, the habitus attuned to one’s own nation makes it ap-
pear unrealistic, even naïve. (Elias 2010 [1987], 203)  
The first reason for this is that humanity “is not threatened by other, non-
human groups, but only by sub-groups within itself”, while “at all other levels 
of integration the we-feeling has developed in conjunction with threats to one’s 
own group by other groups” (Elias 2010 [1987], 204). 
Now, the contemporary EU would obviously be deficient in terms of actual 
democracy, perhaps since its foundation. It is the famous “democratic deficit” 
quite recently reassessed by Hix and Follesdal (2006; see also Weiler et al. 
1995; Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). Europe would even more obviously lack 
a real “enemy” (Manent 2006; Duez 2014). Ultimately, this political entity was 
historically founded as an economic and peace project. In essence, people are 
likely to be indifferent to Europe because they don’t “feel” like Europeans. 
Europe is not a “we,” and that would be the problem. The lack of legitimacy of 
the EU would take its source there: there’s no European habitus that would be 
broadly shared by a majority, the people simply don’t “believe” in EU, and 
don’t behave accordingly, if we consider the minimal definition of social legit-
imacy provided by Max Weber (1976 [1922], Chapter III). That problem would 
have two sources. On the one hand,  
the individual citizens who, in parliamentary democracies have painfully won 
the right to control their own fates to a limited extent through elections within 
the state framework, have virtually no chance of influencing events on the 
global plane of integration. (Elias 2010 [1987], 149)  
And this has partly something to do with European integration, as part of a 
“global integration spur,” still “in an early phase” according to Elias in 1987 
but which undoubtedly “increases the impotence of the individual” (Elias 2010 
[1987], 149). On the other hand, and partly as a result, the resistance of national 
habitus, or the drag effect, could be finally be explained when  
the emotional tinge of we-identity grows noticeably fainter in relation to post-
national forms of integration, such as Unions of African, Latin American, 
Asian or European States. (Elias 2010 [1987], 183) 
3.   Advances and Blind Spots in Recent European Studies 
The deepening of European integration from the beginning of the 1990s led 
scholars to investigate citizens’ relationship to EU in a context marked by the 
debate on the democratic deficit. In particular, studies dedicated to citizens 
developed and thrived in the peculiar climate that followed the difficult ratifi-
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cation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and in a context of increasing interro-
gations surrounding the legitimacy of the EU. As the citizen became a central 
figure on the European political scene, the construction of a veritable commu-
nity of researchers around these questions followed.3 Today there is a signifi-
cant and well-defined body of work looking at the opinions and attitudes of 
citizens towards integration. It is important to look at their results in order to 
better situate what added value a reflection anchored in the notion of the habi-
tus drag effect as presented in the first sections will have. 
Within European studies, a consensus developed during the first period – 
from the 1970s to the 1990s – affirming that the legitimacy of the EU was, 
above all, based on performance or outputs based support – as envisaged by 
(neo-) functionalist theories. Citizens were assumed to perceive the integration 
process as legitimate to the extent that this process produced policies that they 
saw as having a positive impact, particularly in economic terms. The work of 
Gabel is particularly important here, paving the way for an analysis of support 
in utilitarian terms (Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995). He defends the idea 
that individual attitudes towards European integration are the result of a ration-
al calculation in which everyone weighs the economic costs and benefits of 
what he or she personally expects from integration. Although this assessment 
was initially near universal, the conclusions drawn from it varied considerably. 
Certain commentators affirmed that the European political system could only 
survive in the long term with this utilitarian support. Others, however, consid-
ered that legitimacy based on outputs is as fragile as it is fluctuating and that 
only legitimacy from inputs, based on the construction of a political communi-
ty, would guarantee the stability of the European political system (Scharpf 
1999). Thus, faced with the limitations of these explanations in terms of eco-
nomic preferences, from then on, other authors have questioned the role of 
belonging to a political community as determining factors in citizens’ support 
for European integration.4 As Duchesne argues,  
in the space of a decade, research dealing with the relationship between citi-
zens and the political system born out of European integration, have generally 
swapped an attitudes based approach for questions relating to identity. (Duch-
esne 2006, 141) 
This second approach is not new,5 but in the 2000s European studies began 
showing a veritable passion for the notion of identity – and of belonging in the 
                                                             
3  This section is necessarily selective and important references are missing. The interested 
reader will find more references in Duchesne et al. (2013) and Van Ingelgom (2014).  
4  For an overview of the literature on European identity, see the special issue of the journal 
Politique Européenne edited by Duchesne and, in particular, her introduction (Duchesne 
2010). 
5  Duchesne and Frognier posed the question of European identity as early as 1995. Their 
article both challenges the concept and situates it within a scientific context still marked by 
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following (Duchesne 2010). From this point, the idea that the affective rela-
tionship of Europeans to the new Union would gain strength and even compete 
with ties to their national political communities began to spread rapidly in the 
literature (Duchesne 2006). These questions of changing identities then paved 
the way for a third period marked by the issue of “resistance” to European 
integration – well-known under the notion of “Euroscepticism.” National iden-
tity is then considered as a factor that explains the rejection of European inte-
gration by some citizens (Carey 2002). However, numerous authors have ques-
tioned the idea that European identity develops in opposition to national 
identity; instead they suggest that these two identities are cumulative. Accord-
ing to Duchesne and Frognier, for example, we should distinguish between the 
sociological and political dimensions of territorial identity and consider the 
relationship between European and national identity in this duality (Duchesne 
and Frognier 1995, 2002, 2008). 
In a nutshell, from the mid-1990s, there are two distinct trends in European 
research. The first pursues the exploration of support for integration with spe-
cific attention to utilitarian strategies that may be behind positive and negative 
attitudes. The other investigates the possible development of an affective di-
mension in citizens’ relations to Europe through the analysis of changing iden-
tities (Diez Medrano and Gutierrez 2001). At the same time, studies continue to 
focus on different levels of support by country, and on the different aspects of 
support, “instrumental” or “affective” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). The 
majority of this research is based on a series of questions asked in the biannual 
Eurobarometer opinion surveys that have been carried out from the 1970s by 
the European Commission. 
By the end of the 1990s, however, European studies also experienced a 
methodological turn, which has been labelled as the “qualitative turn” (Duch-
esne et al. 2010, 2013; Van Ingelgom 2014). Starting from diverse but mostly 
comparative methods, this research also studies the relationship between Euro-
pean citizens and the European project. Relying on qualitative data (interviews 
and focus groups) and contrary to the established understanding of utilitarian 
and affective support, these qualitative studies converge in demonstrating the 
low salience of European integration for ordinary citizens (Diez Medrano 2004; 
Duchesne at al. 2010, 2013; Gaxie, Hubé and Rowell 2011; Hurrelmann, Gora 
and Wagner 2013; Meinhof 2004; White 2011). Those for whom European 
integration is an important issue, to which they refer spontaneously or with 
emotion, are the exception rather than the norm (Duchesne et al. 2013). It 
seems therefore difficult to analyse the discourses of citizens on the basis of the 
notion of “support” or of “belonging.” In short, or by default, the notion of 
“indifference” seems to best describe the relationship of a large portion of 
                                                                                                                                
the permissive consensus model, which was then only beginning to be questioned (Duch-
esne and Frognier 1995). 
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citizens towards European integration (Duchesne et al. 2013; Van Ingelgom 
2012, 2014). European citizens have not only become more ambivalent but also 
more indifferent in the last couple of decades. There are limitations to over-
reliance on a one-dimensional understanding of the change in citizens’ attitudes 
to integration from support to rejection. These attitudes are actually far more 
complex, and it is necessary to take indifference and indecision into account, as 
well as ambivalence (Van Ingelgom 2014). 
Ultimately, it would seem that European studies came to lay the foundations 
for a better understanding of emotions and feelings – and their absence – which 
make it possible to understand more intimately the relations that citizens have – 
or do not have – with the European political system. However, this is not yet 
the case. First, European studies have for too long remained dependent on 
Eurobarometer data and on the David Easton’s analysis framework (Van 
Ingelgom 2014; Duchesne and Van Ingelgom 2015). The utilitarian support 
versus affective support dichotomy (Easton 1965, 1975) is easy to use with 
survey data. Conversely, the intensity of a feeling or its absence remains diffi-
cult to detect with these same tools.6 The use of survey data also contributes to 
maintaining a marked opposition between reason and feeling that does not shed 
much light on theses complex issues. Second, if qualitative approaches have 
contributed to renewing sociological approaches and revealed among other 
things the importance of indifference among citizens towards Europe, the no-
tion of indifference does not escape a certain theoretical weakness of European 
studies (Duchesne and Van Ingelgom 2015). This is why we propose (as illus-
trated in the following point) to complete the pursuit of qualitative research by 
investigating Elias’s theoretical contribution and intuitions. 
4.   Talking with Young People in Brussels 
This last section is built on an enquiry that took place in Brussels, at the heart 
of the EU. As already said, it is based on six collective discussions (focus 
groups) involving 35 young people (aged 16 to 26, having been at least social-
ized in Brussels since their childhood if not born in Belgium), held between 
November 2013 and May 2014.7 The focus on young people appeared particu-
larly relevant, as they represent the generation that grew up in a mature and 
particularly debated Europe (Down and Wilson 2013). Moreover, Brussels is 
both an extremely dense political environment, with the presence of many 
political levels, and a cosmopolitan metropolis where different interpretations 
                                                             
6  For an exception see Van Ingelgom (2012).  
7  The discussions took place in French. In order to guarantee anonymity to the participants, 
their names have been changed in the transcriptions and in the article, but we have tried to 
keep the origin of each name. 
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of belonging to a community might be experienced. These focus groups of 
three and a half hours each included 4 to 7 participants who did not know each 
other but lived in each case in the same area of the city (see Appendix). Con-
sidering the spatial segregation of Brussels (Kesteloot and Loopmans 2009), 
the choice of the neighbourhoods makes it possible to interview people with 
diverse socio-demographic features. Although gender and age balanced (for 
instance), participants shared similar social characteristics in each focus group 
so that they could talk to each other (Duchesne and Haegel 2004).8 Through 
this setting, the aim is not to establish representative samples, but to gather 
contrasted experiences of living and belonging in Brussels. Through the obser-
vation of the interactions between participants and the comparison between the 
focus groups, the structures of the meanings of (EU) politics were made visible. 
This methodology helps to shed light on “how points of views are constructed 
and expressed” (Kitzinger and Barbour 1999, 5). It makes possible to deepen 
their social constructions, as well as the meanings for a “group of citizens” 
(who for some, under 18, do not vote): young people. In a nutshell, these focus 
groups were conducted with young people from different socio-economic and 
cultural contexts in Brussels. 
Three key strands emerged through the analysis of their exchanges. First, in 
relation to the question of belonging to a political community in the terms of a 
“we” compared to a “they,” the analysis reveals the expression of alternative 
positioning within the supposedly existing political communities (be it Bel-
gium, Brussels Capital Region, or Europe). Second, it seems that attitudes of 
withdrawal when talking about politics are sometimes emotionally critical 
and/or negative, and that feelings are not especially, to put it briefly, synony-
mous of shared positive feelings (for example of belonging). Finally, as far as 
indifference is concerned, as usually defined by a lack of emotions, as a kind of 
“insensitivity,” it cannot be confused with an affective “detachment” (Distan-
zierung) in the positive and, sometimes, normative sense that Elias gave to this 
term (Elias 2007, 68-104). Contrary to indifference, the latter can favour a 
concerned but critical look and even something like a “detached” involvement 
vis-à-vis the European policy as some young people demonstrate as well. 
4.1   I/We/They: The Importance of Inner Separations 
Following Elias’s theory, one way of understanding how young people feel 
about belonging to a community, in the broadest sense of the term, is to look at 
                                                             
8  A set of six questions was asked in each group. Two questions were first put to the partici-
pants relative to the identification of collective problems in society and of the people able 
to solve these problems. Participants were then asked in the third question to comment on 
different political levels on the basis of photos representing various political institutions. 
The fourth question targeted the EU level directly. The two last questions were focused on 
the identification of “communities” young people feel a part of. 
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the “we-they” relationships. It is of course not the only dimension to take into 
account. Rather, the definition of the group’s boundaries, through the opposi-
tion to “the other,” is one of the elements from which the feeling of belonging 
can be constructed and analysed, even if other elements participate, sometimes 
even more centrally, in defining this “we” (Duchesne 2005; Delmotte 2008). 
The empirical material suggests that this articulation between a “we” and a 
“they” also leads to a positioning inside of a (political) community (as objec-
tively defined as such as a nation state, but also as a region, a municipality, or 
the EU), especially by expressing particular demands on access to social bene-
fits or about the relations between politicians and citizens. 
Therefore, the “we/they” relationship is mobilized to claim a kind of priority 
over certain social rights “due” by the national political entity to those who, 
independently of their nationality, were born “here” or have been living here 
for longer, those who speak the language and who have worked here, unlike 
other people who have settled in Belgium (Brussels) more recently and whose 
country of origin has “recently” joined the EU. The presence of new Europeans 
is seen primarily as aggravating competition in the employment market espe-
cially for those young people who grew up in families situated at the lower end 
of the socio-economic spectrum. 
Established and Outsiders I (Group discussion: Saint-Josse) 
Lila: In the CPAS [the local public social services centres in Belgium]... The 
fact that they provide social services more easily, for instance, to people from 
the countries that have just joined the EU like, for example, Romania and 
Bulgaria. And so we see all these people who joined not so long ago... Well, 
yeah, it’s true, not so long ago, but we see all sorts, all sorts, people who come 
from Bulgaria, from Romania. They’re all entitled to social services whereas a 
person who was born here, in Belgium, and who, who… 
Naima: Who speaks the language... 
Lila: Who speaks the language... Who doesn’t have the means to really... 
Jordan: Who even worked for his country. 
Lila: That’s it, who even – that’s it. And who isn’t entitled to his rights, I want 
to say. Because it’s his right too. We were born here. We worked for them. 
Jordan: It’s frustrating… 
Lila: It’s frustrating. That’s also what I wanted to say. 
These participants claim a certain exclusivity regarding the benefits linked to 
living in a national political entity – here Belgium – rather than expressing a 
feeling of belonging to this entity. This quote highlights the competition be-
tween different socio-economic “groups” within the European political com-
munity. The “we” mainly refers to young people who were born or grown up in 
Brussels (in Belgium) and the “they” refers to the foreigners or newcomers in a 
perfect accordance with Elias’s distinction between “established” and “outsid-
ers” (Elias 2008). A differentiated membership (old, new Europeans or Bel-
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gians) is used to claim rights, even within or between the migrant populations 
that nothing distinguishes but only the length of the social existence as a group 
in Belgium, the social age (the “‘oldness’ of association,” Elias 2008, 4-5). 
This observation does not exclude that some young people from these 
groups recognize that EU or third-country migrants are actually in the same 
situation today than their own parents or grandparents a few decades ago. They 
can understand them and identify with these newcomers. Nevertheless, the 
young Brusselers hardly consider that they belong to the same community and 
that the newcomers deserve the same rights. Nisrine (24, student in higher 
education) sheds a different light by explaining that the source of these prob-
lems is in fact due to the functioning of the economy. Without much success, 
she is trying to call for the common past shared by the young participating in 
her group in Anderlecht (they are all second generation of migrants as their 
parents have migrated to Belgium). She is doing this to enlarge the picture and 
to give a more comprehensive analysis of the situation. 
Established and Outsiders II (Group discussion: Anderlecht) 
Nisrine: Surface technician attention [laughs]. It does not exist anymore today. 
At that time, 30 years ago, it was our parents who accepted that kind of job. 
But now, we, their children, ah, now we have studied, et cetera. We all have 
different degrees. We also do not want to do that. So it will be Bulgarians or 
Poles, etc. who will come and seek this kind of job. So it’s not really true that 
it’s because of them that there’s no more work anymore in Belgium. 
It is worth noting that the national community is thus perceived as a kind of 
survival unit as observed by Elias – but in a rather emotionally detached way. 
Once again, that does not mean that young people especially identify with 
Belgium (which is in general the relevant level for the social security system in 
the Belgian federal state). To sum up, the question is then: Will the “we-
feeling” tend to adapt to the political communities or entities that derive from 
growing interdependence and a changing balance of power between groups, 
namely encompassing all the young people looking for jobs in a free market 
EU and coming for instance, from East and South? At this stage, and related to 
this topic, the reference group appears more to be the type that believe they 
exclusively deserve the social rights and benefits: the people who were there 
(“here”) first. 
4.2   “We” the Young People, “They” the Political Leaders 
The “we-they” partition also refers to the partition between the politicians 
(“they”) and the citizens or the (young) people (“we”). This is particularly clear 
in the following section. Nisrine (from previous quotation) and Alexandre (20, 
in high school) describe what the pictures that were shown in the third portion 
of the discussion – picturing the town hall, regional, national, and European 
parliaments and through them the different levels of power – represent for 
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them. Nisrine expresses her difficulty to associate institutions with something 
she would feel attached to. At the very same time, it confirms that one can be a 
national of a country, one can be Belgian because one was born in Belgium, 
and do not feel attached to Belgium, to use Nisrine’s words, “inside oneself.” 
The subjective element, which is here associated with an affective dimension, 
in any case with a sensitive one (“Do I really feel inside of me, really attached 
to all this?”) leads her to question her attachment to the national level at this 
point of the discussion, and a little bit later, to the European level. Thus, the 
national level is not better treated or viewed as more relevant for her. 
An ambivalent feeling of belonging (Group discussion: Anderlecht) 
Nisrine: For me, for me, these aren’t only actually places [commenting on the 
pictures representing the buildings that house political institutions present in 
Brussels]. These are places but... when I see that, I wonder, “Myself, do I feel 
Belgian?” [laughs]. It’s really the first thing I say to myself. Because I’m Bel-
gian, that’s clear. I was born here. But, do I really feel inside of me, really at-
tached to all this? Am I committed to this country? Am I attached? I don’t 
think so. [...] 
Alexandre: I understand what you [Nisrine] mean. But at the same time, I 
know, it’s weird, I mean, in all countries… even Americans who live near the 
White House, they see it and then after... 
As it will be confirmed below, a distinction between “we” and “they” made by 
young people refers to a division between citizens and political elites. It is 
however worth mentioning that during the discussions, participants sometimes 
hierarchize the political levels (local, regional, national, European) – and thus 
their proximity or distance to elites – on a proximate-distance scale. When 
participants classify them according to the concrete character of their interven-
tions, the local authority usually comes first. Administrative tasks give a par-
ticular traceability to the actions of the local political level. It is easier to under-
stand why this local level is involved in their life, in the same way school and 
police do for respective reasons. 
To explore the question of the place of affects when young people express 
their relationship to politics, one can be interested in a passage where Bilal (26, 
student in physiotherapy) talks about his “job” as a student for five years in the 
European Parliament. He mentions that when he met deputies, they barely said 
“Hello.” Nisrine comments that representatives should always take citizens into 
account, even workers at the European Parliament. Yet Bilal explains that these 
people cope with the demands of a specific job. He does not use this personal 
experience as an example of a lack of proximity although, at other moments in 
the discussion, he makes clear that the collapse of the EU would be rather 
beneficial (because of the economic competition induced by free movement). 
The rulers and the ruled (Group discussion: Anderlecht) 
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Bilal: Honestly, when bumping into the [European] deputies and all that, you 
could see that… because we were just there to hoover the place, they weren’t 
interested in us. Even just saying “hello,” it was rare for them to say that. 
Nisrine: Just goes to show, eh. […] 
Bilal: Me, I don’t agree. I think they were just there to do their job. They 
weren’t interested in those who were doing something else, you know. 
Ilias: Yeah, that makes sense. 
Nisrine: Although it’s us that it concerns. So me too I find that … 
Bilal: They [deputies] don’t see us as citizens that can vote for Europe, but 
more like workers who are just there. 
In this section, Bilal does not merely expose a wound or denounce the disre-
gard from the deputies, but notes rather calmly that these deputies “do not see 
[those who clean their offices] as citizens who can vote for Europe, but more 
like workers who are just there.” And other participants to conclude, as serene-
ly: it is about “us”; it is up to us to “prove” them, and if “we want to do some-
thing, to do it.” 
Thus, when considering democratic linkages between elites and citizens, 
from some participants’ point of view, it is also the citizens’ responsibility to 
decide to be involved. Louis (17, in high school, Ixelles) explains: “If we dis-
tance ourselves from the politicians, there’ll be no more democracy.” The 
division between citizens (“we”) and political elites (“they”) is still crucial here 
but has to be considered in a different way. Indeed, a distinct representation of 
politics that emerges from the analysis of the data collected relies on young 
people’s critical reflections on their own responsibility as (future) citizens. It is 
based on the idea expressed by some of the participants that citizens should be 
able to appropriate that world, by controlling and criticizing it, they should 
participate. In other words, if these participants voice discontent about the 
authorities’ behaviour, they still adhere to the political regime or accept it, and 
don’t contest its existence. 
The following quotation builds further on this idea. When, in response to the 
fourth question (“What does the EU represent for you?”), participants discuss 
the meaning of the EU, they criticize the actual posture of EU actors rather than 
the idea of Europe. For Nicolas (21, marketing student), the EU is a clever idea, 
but the concrete actions implemented by political authorities are problematic. 
Following Nicolas’s comment, Julie (24, social science student) and Théo (19, 
medical student) clarify their views. Earlier they had both expressed strong 
rejection of the EU, but they now distinguish between the idea of the EU, 
which they support, and the way it works, which they reject or criticise.9 
                                                             
9  This distinction between what the EU should be and what it does, so to say between ideas 
and experiences on the EU, has been underlined in a very different context by Van Ingelgom 
when studying ambivalence towards the EU (Van Ingelgom 2013, 2014).  
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Europe, “a clever idea” (Group discussion: Uccle) 
Nicolas: It’s a pity [the fact that no one is interested in Europe], it’s a pity be-
cause… Yeah, there’s a good potential behind Europe. Basically, it’s a clever 
idea, it’s a good idea. 
Sophie: Yes, but you see… 
Nicolas: They did some good things, but now, well, as you say, it’s a bit like 
they’re – well, they’re kind of fucking with us! 
Théo: Me, I think that Europe isn’t a bad thing in itself. 
Nicolas: Oh no, it’s not a bad thing at all. 
Julie: No, I’m not saying it’s a bad thing. 
4.3  Indifference, really? 
The distinction between “they,” the politicians, and “we,” the citizens, thus 
refers to a variety of reactions in the discussions, ranging from involvement to 
alienation; from apathy to “critical” citizenship. This section underlines that 
attitudes of withdrawal and reserve when talking about politics – as developed 
in the previous section – sometimes clearly appear as critical and emotionally 
negative, sometimes more constructive and “positive,” to a certain extent. 
Indeed, some participants articulate a vision of a general incapacity to 
change how society works both individually and collectively, and an inability 
to identify concrete influences of political actions in their life. Political authori-
ties could not fulfil their needs. These young people hold quite negative views 
about the rulers’ behaviour. Politics does not seem to involve them. These 
views can be better understood when one looks at the life experience of these 
participants, marked by social vulnerability and uncertainty for some who grew 
up in families on the lower end of the socio-economic scale. Their interpreta-
tive lenses of the political world are grounded in their experience. However, a 
diversity of views exists, as the following section shows. 
Mariam (24, unemployed social worker, living in Molenbeek) cannot identi-
fy what political intervention is useful for. She says: “politics – well, every-
thing related to politics – it doesn’t interest me at all. If it had been a sports 
club, yeah, I’d surely have joined, I’d surely know more.” She adds that “they 
are those who create problems sometimes.” She does not feel she should know 
something about politics or try to interact with the rulers, because she believes 
that this would not change anything in her life. Mariam comments on the Euro-
pean quarter in Brussels: “That’s where the European capital [is]. That’s where 
all – all the other countries of Europe get together.” But if a great distance is 
expressed in this discussion, it is not only regarding the EU level, but concern-
ing all political levels, as remarked by Asma (17, in high school, living in Mo-
lenbeek): “The photos don’t speak to me, none of them does.” One would 
perhaps have expected that the presence of EU institutions in Brussels would 
have made the EU more accessible or more present. Yet, interestingly, the EU 
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presence is visible in young people’s discourse, but mostly provides them with 
the opportunity to illustrate the gap between their world and the EU. 
However this real alienation is certainly not the only form that distance 
takes, and, it seems, not the most important. Indeed, the distance can also ex-
press a critical view on what Europe is. While the young people are discussing 
the EU in Ixelles, Maël (25, with a high school diploma, odd jobs) argues that 
being able to travel around Europe is a real advantage. For her part, Inaya (19, 
student in economy) thinks that this is not enough to justify the existence of the 
EU. 
EU and free movement: “What else?” (Group discussion: Ixelles) 
Maël: Me, I find that in the zone we’re in, it’s cool because we can travel real-
ly easily from one [country] to the other, and I always have good contacts with 
everyone. And I don’t feel like [referring to a person in a foreign country who 
could comment on him]: “Ah, he’s from another country, I’ve got to be care-
ful when he’s there.” Well, I don’t know. 
Inaya: Well, there was no need to call it the EU, then. 
Maël: Well… 
Louis: [inaudible]… 
Inaya: I’ve the impression that that’s the only thing [the freedom to travel] that 
is beneficial. 
Maël: I like that. 
Inaya: Well, no, it’s great, but I mean, what else is there, you know? 
Even if these participants consider free movement as a benefit of EU integra-
tion and a right they are able to make use of, it is not enough to justify the 
existence of the EU. This specific disconnection opens the door for a critical 
posture that asks for “more” Europe, in a way. This critical distance is even 
leading to a more “positive” attitude opening to a critical and constructive 
reflection in the next quote that is taking place in Uccle. 
Does the EU “mean much”? (Group discussion: Uccle) 
Théo: You’re okay with that Julie? I also agree that [the EU] does not mean 
much [commenting on a paper that Sophie previously wrote about the EU]. 
Sophie: “It does not mean much.” But at the same time, you [Théo] wrote 
many things [on the board facing them] [laughs]! 
Nicolas: Yes, but me, the “does not mean much,” rather it was based on the 
idea ... 
Théo: It could represent 1,000 times more than that... I mean... It means noth-
ing compared to what it should. We know nothing. Fishing [referring to a pre-
vious discussion on fishing policy] is something that I have, I had to read four 
years ago or something like that. 
If the EU “does not mean much” to them, this expression of “not meaning 
much” is not based on an absence of effective knowledge as Théo evoked 
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many things related to the EU during the discussion. However, what is clear for 
them is that the EU should mean more, making clear that their reactions cannot 
be reduced to current Euroscepticism even if they are anchored in a critical 
distance towards the EU. On the contrary, they do perceive the concrete outputs 
of the EU, but these are insufficient to them; the feeling of “knowing nothing” 
that is mentioned by Théo fuels their distance. This aspect is well illustrated by 
Nour (19, web design student) when she comments on the question mark she 
draws on a card with Yusef (23, communication student) to explain what the 
EU is. The researcher asks what this question mark means to them. 
“The EU is also big questions” (Group discussion: Jette) 
Researcher: And why, what does it mean, your joker? 
Nour: Because you [addressing the researcher], you asked what – what was – 
what the EU meant for us? Well, there you are. The EU is also big questions. 
So, quite simply that and then there are things I don’t understand. I’d need two 
dictionaries to understand. I, I’ve no way of knowing, I don’t know … 
Researcher: Although in the end, it’s in Brussels, the EU. 
Nathan: That’s the problem. It’s that Europe is really distant from – well, from 
its citizens, you know. It’s something up there in the clouds [pointing to the 
sky]. 
Nour says that she is unable to understand how EU politics work. Nathan (26, 
political science diploma, unemployed) directly comments on her words by 
saying that this is a problem and this is somewhat proof of the problematic 
distance between citizens and the EU. Nevertheless, later in the discussion, 
Nour rather expresses a positive view of the EU: 
For me, it’s [the EU] rather positive because I can’t remember – well, before 
the EU. I was far too young to know what it was like. I wonder if… we’re go-
ing to… be able to manage. I don’t know. 
She mentions that the existence of the EU is somehow good by default, again 
underlying that this critical distance is far from being a purely Eurosceptic 
stance on the EU. 
5.   Conclusion 
To briefly and temporarily conclude, the first series of analysis reveal that 
supposed indifference from some of the young people covers very different 
significances that are indeed irreducible to Euroscepticism. By talking with 
them, it appears that a majority of the interviewed young people in Brussels 
know more than they admit about Europe and politics. The discussions in the 
groups also reveal the importance of a “panel of emotions” (Delmotte, Merce-
nier and Van Ingelgom 2017), which rely on personal living experiences, as 
Belgians, urban migrants’ (grand)children, workers or students. Young people 
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are also more or less attached to some European achievements or “outputs” 
(Scharpf 1999), and are of course more evidently disappointed by Europe’s 
powerlessness to solve the problems the society faces, such as unemployment 
for instance. 
Regarding our initial hypothesis, particularly surrounding a national habitus 
drag effect, we observe that saying “we” about Europe still appears to be very 
difficult 30 years after Elias’s text. Young people do not seem to be particularly 
attached to Europe in an affective way. Yet, interestingly, they also do not 
seem to be more attached to Belgium, maybe more to Brussels. It can be partly 
due to specificities of the Belgian and Brussels’ contexts, but young people are 
probably less attached to the national level and more attached to Europe than 
the previous generation was. In that sense, the enquiry seems to confirm Elias’s 
intuitions: the European feelings have probably grown, but remain weak (Elias 
2010 [1987], 201-2). 
Above all, in regards to “us” and “them,” collective interviews with young 
Brusselers revealed that additional partitions are indeed more relevant. For 
them, the “we” often refers to “we, the young people,” or to the young people 
“living in Brussels” or “in this part of Brussels.” Additionally, the “they” does 
not necessarily refer to an external “enemy” or “other.” In particular, the USA 
and Israel are mentioned in some groups but most often the young people use 
the “they” to refer to European outsiders from South Europe (the poor) or East 
(the newly arrived). Even more evidently, “they” is used to refer to an inner 
separation between the politicians and the people (“we”), at all levels. In this, 
collective interviews also confirm an important idea expressed in 1987: all 
integration processes are marked at the beginning by a shift of power that be-
gins by “increasing the impotence of the individual” (Elias 2010 [1987], 149). 
On the other hand, the research reveals, regarding young people, there is a 
certain potential for critical self-detachment, or for what we term a “detached 
involvement,” perhaps more necessary to any development of democracy in the 
EU than a still hypothetic European feeling of belonging. 
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Appendix 
The composition of the focus groups (FG) by area in Brussels (for the sake of 
anonymity, all names have been changed). 
 
FG110 
Saint-
Josse 
FG2 
Molenbeek 
FG3 
Anderlecht 
FG4 
Jette 
FG5 
Ixelles 
FG6 
Uccle 
Naima 
(f/24) 
Lila 
(f/23) 
Leila 
(f/18) 
Jordan 
(m/22) 
Abdel 
(m/17) 
Asma (f/17) 
Mariam (f/24) 
Odomar (m/17) 
Yassine (m/16) 
 
Nisrine (f/24) 
Amina (f/19) 
Nabila (f/19) 
Alexandre 
(m/20) 
Ilias (m/18) 
Bilal (m/26) 
Waleed 
(m/17) 
Catherine 
(f/23) 
Nour (f/19) 
Lucie (f/17) 
Gabriel 
(h/21) 
Nathan 
(m/26) 
Adil (m/21) 
Yusef (m/23) 
Aicha 
(f/25) 
Inaya 
(f/19) 
Danielle 
(f/17) 
Isabella 
(f/22) 
Mun 
(m/20) 
Louis 
(m/17) 
Maël 
(m/25) 
Sophie (f/22) 
Elise (f/17) 
Julie (f/24) 
Théo (m/19) 
Nicolas (m/21) 
 
Lower end of the socio-economic spectrum 
 
Middle end 
of the socio-
economic 
spectrum 
Middle and upper end of the 
socio-economic spectrum 
 
 
                                                             
10  In the FG 1/2/3, most participants come from the second or third generation of migrants in 
Belgium (Pakistan, Morocco, Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa). 
